Language Is Rule-Governed

Language Is Rule-GovernedWittgenstein utter that his aim in philosophy was to show the fly the way tabu of the fly-bottle that is, to lead us knocked out(p) of the web of misconceptions and confusions that cloud our under put forwarding. He argued that our confusion lay in our mistaking of expression and the regularises that govern its design. This mis intellectual resulted from the assumptions of traditional Western Philosophy which argon found on a Cartesian hypothesis of mind, a Platonist conception of reality and an Augustinian envision of nomenclature. These assumptions led to the belief that the private mental realm was the primary antecedent of row, the essential function of language was to name objects, and the recovers of language were set in a fixed type of application respectively. As this poster of harnesss relies on their having a fixed content, the save way to quest after these rules is to discern their heart by finding an appropriate mediating ind ication. Once the rules draw been interpreted the right way, they would indeed disclose how they should be utilize. Wittgenstein argued that these assumptions cloud the true nature of rule- avocation and meaning, leaving them vulnerable to scepticism as we lay down rules, a technique for heartening a game, and that then, when we follow up on the rules, things dont turn out as we had assumed. So that we argon, as it were, entangled in our own rules.2The issue that Wittgenstein raises is if we feces argue that every action fecal matter be interpreted as acting in accordance with a rule, how aro habit we ever know if we are by-line a rule correctly and in that respectfore, how can we justify that our use of language holds any meaning? This reveals the mars in the traditional belief that it is the rules themselves that act as the normative warnings by which we discern whether or not our use of language is correct. Therefore, we must smelling for another source of normativ ity in order to preserve the notion of meaning.In light of Wittgensteins turn over that next a rule is a practice3which is analogous to obeying an order4, I believe that his banknote of language establishes it as rule-governed by situating the requisite excuse and normativity in the linguistic federation. These requisites are met in Wittgensteins posting as when we are taught a rule we are also instruct to follow it in a position way intractable by the linguistic alliance of which we are a member. I will expound this view by firstly looking at the rule-following considerations as found in 185 and 201 to explicate Wittgensteins view that we cannot establish how to follow a rule correctly by looking at the rule itself, that kinda we must establish at how the rule is applied as part of a communal practice. I will then use Meredith Williams critique of capital of Minnesota Kripkes sceptical settlement to the paradox and her argument for a communitarian view of Wittgenste ins depict of rule-following to discuss what a socially embedded justification and standard of normativity might entail. Following from this I will go on to examine John McDowells critique of Crispin Wrights anti-realism in order to discuss how a social normative standard can be established through the shared visualizeings held by a linguistic biotic community.When describing the purpose of the rule-following considerations, Wittgenstein stated that what we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand5by which he doer that through a re-evaluation the nature of language we may dis unclutter the empty questions that traditional philosophy had been concerned with, including the question of what constitutes meaning. Wittgenstein aimed to achieve this by reminding the reader that rule-following cannot be a mental process by which we discern the meaning of the rule and then establish a set principle of application. P erhaps the most important issue with the traditional view of rule-following that Wittgensteins attack brings to light is the regress of commentary. Wittgenstein highlights this flaw in the belief that adaptation necessarily clarifies the content of a rule and provides a method of application. He does so by stating that at that place is no reason why an interpretation may not be just as ambiguous as the rule itself and therefore may also be event to the comparable interpretative process as the rule. No ane interpretation is going to be apparent in either situation to e truly various(prenominal). Therefore, the move to symbolic language does not clarify the rules contents, it precisely leads to a regress as in this chain of reasoning we place matchless interpretation stinker another as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we supposition of yet another lying behind it.6This regress means firstly that there is no supreme justification to be found through i nterpretation, and indorsely that the countless interpretations that a rule may be subject to renders the rule meaningless. From this Wittgenstein concludes that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation7, meaning that thought is not always aligned with the act of interpretation and rule-following does not necessarily use up a mediating interpretation amidst the rule and its application.A second challenge uses the discrepancy mingled with the innumerous applications of a rule and the finite amount of times we can observe this application. This discrepancy shows that we cannot regard our rationality of a rule as the grasping of a set pattern of application that we must simulate in every future circumstance. Wittgenstein explicates this challenge in his degenerate learner example in divide 185, in which a student fronts to be following a numerical series +2 correctly up until he reaches 1,000 where he then changes to the series of +4. If the teacher h ad made the student fall apart following the series before 1,000 he would have never known that the student misunderstood the rule that he had been taught. The deviant learner also brings forth the issue that for any rule applied, for example, a 100 times, we can imagine other rules that give the same results but then diverges on its 101st application. This means that we cannot turn over of the meaning of rules as an countless set of their application and therefore it is implausible to argue that when we explain a rule that we have an infinite set in mind. Just like the teacher in the deviant learner example, we may believe that close toone has master copyed the application of a rule, up until the point where they find to get it wrong. This may happen at any point through a sequence and thereof there is no way of knowing for certain if the person has understood the rule. Therefore, if we represent rules as infinite sets of applications but we only deal with finite numbers of these applications we can never be sure that we have successfully taught the rule, or are following it correctly ourselves. This means that if we wish to examine rules through how we follow them rather than their content, we cannot regard rule-following as being guided by rails invisibly laid out to infinity8if we wish to develop any semblance of normativity.Regarding his own view of the relation between a rule, our intellectual of it and our method of application, Wittgenstein uses the analogy of playing chess, stating where is the connection effected between the sense of the words lets play a game of chess and all the rules of the game? Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the everyday practice of playing9. This means that our rationality of a rule results in how we are taught to understand it and this socially constructed comprehension manifests in the action of following of the rule as part of a custom. For example, when we merging a signpost poi nting right, we fight to this by turning right because there is an established custom of doing so which we are initiated into through training. As there is clearly nothing inherent in the arrow that tells us how to react to it, this custom can only have been established by the community of which we are a member. Although Wittgenstein makes it clear that he believes that how we follow a rule is how we participate in a communal custom, he discovers the caper concerning the sustainment of normativity that this view must address. If our understanding is moulded by how we are trained, what happens when two people react to their training differently and how do we know which reaction is the correct one?10As it is the community that establishes how we follow a rule, and we can make no valid reference to the rule itself, it must then be the community that decides whether an individual follows a rule correctly. However, is there any way to prove that the community can provide the normative standard required to know whether or not we are following a rule correctly? I will now address this issue, beginning with an examination of Kripkes sceptical account of rule following.Saul Kripkes discussion of Wittgensteins account of language (which he stressed was not an interpretation, but a line of thought inspired by his reading of Wittgenstein) rests on the sceptical belief that there is no mental fact that can provide an ultimate justification for our belief that we are following the same rule in the same way as we have in the past, and therefore no aim notion of meaning. Although Kripkes account has not been popular, its influence is undeniable as it is used as the point of leaving for the standard approach to rule-following11. Kripke founded his sceptical version of Wittgensteins account of rules on the first challenge to the definitive account that I previously discussed which he named the sceptical paradox.This was our paradox no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can be also brought into run afoul with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.12Kripke saw this issue to be, the most substructure sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date13he stated that the problem lies in that we cannot discern a fact about the mental state of an individual that can justify their belief that they are following a particular rule in the correct way. Thus, the notion of rule-following becomes meaningless. In order to explicate the problem Kripke used the quaddition example in which he asked the reader to imagine in the method of calculation quaddition where,x quus y = x + y if x, y This would mean that quus would give the same results as plus for numerous calculations, up until y In order provide a solution to the sceptical paradox, Kripke argues that Wittgenste in must look for an exterior source for justification and normativity. Kripkes Wittgenstein finds this justification by first accepting the sceptical problem and acknowledging that there can be no ultimate justification therefore the solution must be sceptical itself. From this starting point he then reduces the severity of the problem by disceptation that what is required to solve the sceptical problem are not justness conditions (the facts that meanings must obtain to in order to be true), but justification conditions. These justification conditions rest on our answers to the question what is the role, and the utility in our lives of the practice of maintain (or denying) the form of words under these conditions?14In other words, we must justify our understanding of a rule by showing how we use it within our everyday lives. Our application of the rule is then evaluated by the community as to whether it conforms to the usual application of the rule and is therefore correct.Kripke s sceptical account of rule-following does succeed in providing a comprehensive and plausible account for how we invest meaning into the notion of rule- following through community based justification and evaluation. However, it seems that by accepting the scepticism brought to light by the by the paradox Kripke is guilty of the very misunderstanding that Wittgenstein was trying to correct. Wittgensteins disownion of the sceptical problem appears to be shown in the second paragraph of 201 in which Wittgenstein states that we thereby show that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from occurrence to case application is exhibited in what we betoken following the rule and going against it15. From this it appears that Wittgenstein believed it was possible to reject the view that understanding is reliant on interpretation without having to accept on a sceptical theory of meaning. Meredith Williams highlights Kripkes misunderstanding, arguing that his belief that the apparent lack of epistemic guidance and justification for the correct application of a rule presents a genuine problem reflects a continued allegiance to the ideal expressed in the classical view16. She argues that this allegiance distorts Wittgensteins view by searching for an epistemic solution, preeminent Kripke to replace legality conditions with justification conditions and subjective halt with communal verification. Although Williams shares Kripkes community view of rule-following, she holds that this is not simply a sceptical solution but a genuine source of justification, stating that Wittgensteins answer to the paradox is not a sceptical throwing up of the hands with But this is what I or we do, but an appeal to the social embeddedness of rules17. She also criticizes Kripke for misunderstanding the community view by denying the authority of those who have get the hang the language and forms of life that they are involved with, thus making the autho rity of the community arbitrary. Williams argues that Wittgenstein held an overtly communitarian view of rules, she evens goes as far as to argue that only the communitarian view can provide rules with the power to constrain the behaviour of the individual and space needed for the raw material normative distinction between correct and incorrect.Williams describes the activity of rule-following as a matter of establishing a second nature18. Rules gain their power from appearing natural and inevitable, meaning that we develop an instantaneous and slur loyalty to them. Blind obedience is cultivated through the training of a novice by a master wherein the novice is taught the technique of application that lies in the background and gives content to the formula as rule19. These techniques then become bedrock practices which need no epistemic justification as they are legitimised by their conformity. Williams argues that it is the craft obedience in the application of bedrock judgemen ts and actions that create space for the rule rather than vice versa, which she calls the primacy of action. Williams argues that both(prenominal) the novice and the master act blindly, they are alternative blind as they are unaware of alternative actions and judgements. The Novice is blind as they unquestioningly follow the example and instruction of the master as they are aware of no other alternatives. Masters act blindly as once they have mastered the language they are blind (or no longer subject to) the verification of the community. From this Williams then argues that it is these two kinds of sightlessness than can give weight to the constraints that rules place upon an individual by providing the necessary foundational level needed to stop the regress of interpretation.In regards to the issue of normativity, Williams argues that the necessity of following a rule in a particular way is established through a communal manner which constitutes the form of life against which e rror and mistake, truth and falsity can be discerned.20This means that the community does not provide a normative standard through its assent. Rather, it is the structure of the community or in other words, a certain history and a certain setting21which sustains the regularity of practices over time therefore acting in accordance with this regularity that constitutes following a rule correctly. This means that when we engage in blind actions and judgements, we comply with rules in a way that has been developed in the community of which we are a member, therefore, it is only in relation to the structure practice of the community that the individual can engage in normative activity22.Williams theory of blind obedience as the source of the necessity of rules and normativity of rules as socially constructed appears to be a valid interpretation of Wittgensteins account of rule-following. However, the notion of socially embedded normativity appears to be in need of further examination. E ven if Williams account does not rely on the overtly arbitrary assent of the community, how can an individual compare their understanding of the meaning of an expression with the one provided by the structured practice of the community and furthermore, how may the community secure an individuals understanding of a rule in a comprehensively in order to subject it to verification? In light of these queries, I believe that a more substantial account of social normativity is needed, one that I will explore in John McDowells critique of Crispin Wrights anti-realist theory of meaning.Crispin Wright held a community view of Wittgensteins account of rule-following however, he saw this as necessarily aligned with an anti-realist stance due to the scepticism against investigation-independent truth values that he took to be inherent in Wittgensteins rule-following considerations. fit in to Wright, there can be no such(prenominal) thing as an objective or investigation-independent fact and so the only source of normativity acquirable to a language speaker is the finding of fact of the linguistic community. However, due to the lack of investigation-independence this verdict is arbitrary. Wright challenges the existence of investigation-independence by refuting the hypothetico-deductive picture of understanding which he believes to be a foundational aspect. In the case of learning a language, this theory assumes that the trainee is able to form a hypothesis of what they believe their trainer is attempting to convey. Wright argues that this would suggest that we all have some innate grasp of an idiolectic pattern of application. If this is the case, we can then assume that this acumen is shared communally.Wright rejects this view of understanding as psychologically artificial23as it rests on the assumption that we have such access to understanding that allows us to make verifiable assertions about the meaning of expressions. He argues along similar lines to Kripke, that there is no way that a trainee may prove that her hypothesis correctly mirrors that of the apparent investigation-independent fact in every case of application. This then means that it is not possible to have a direct and privileged insight regarding the requisites of understanding an expression irrespective of whether this insight is shared. If we wish to claim that investigation-independent facts pertaining to language exist, they must be recognizable otherwise the correct use of language would have to be regarded as a radical favorable position of human consciousness24. However, Wrights examination of the hypothetico-deductive picture shows that an individual cannot attribute themselves with the ability to live whether they are exploitation an expression in accordance with the prescribed pattern of the fact, let alone persuade anyone else that they have this ability. From this Wright concludes that there is truth in the idea that it is community of assent which supplies the essential background against which alone it makes sense to speculate of individuals responses as correct or incorrect25. However, if we suppose that this means that the community has the capability that the individual lacks to recognise whether they are conforming to a determined pattern, we are then faced with the same dilemma as the individual as there is no way of knowing whether consensus aligns with correctness. Wright argues that communal consent can be the only authority regarding the correct employment of language (or in other words the application of the rules of language) but for the community itself there is no authority, so no standard to meet26meaning a community does not go right or wrong in accepting a particular verdict on a particular decidable question, rather, it just goes.27In accordance with Wrights belief that meaning cannot be constituted by investigation-independent facts he states that, the only notion of objectivity which the anti-realist can allow himsel f is the ordinary contrast between areas where dis arrangement is taken to betoken error or misunderstanding28. He argues that this is an acceptable view of meaning as our assertions can be given substance through reflecting on our epistemic practices from which they arise. However, this does not seem to be satisfactory, or even in alignment with Wittgensteins intentions due to such statements such as the agreement of ratifications is the pre-condition of our language-game, it is not affirmed in it29. It appears Wittgenstein believed not only that language games and the rules that govern them are not completely determined by ratification, but they needed a stronger validation than such ratifications can provide. Although it is clear that Wittgenstein would not regard our grasping of meaning as the grasping of a private idiolectic pattern, the way in which Wright approaches this seems to threaten normativity in an unnecessary way by associating the invalidity of the hypothetico-ded uctive picture with an inability of a community to recognise whether or not the individual is able to follow rules correctly.McDowell takes this view in his article Following a Rule in which he argues that Wrights anti-realist theory of meaning and understanding is not recognizable as such and furthermore cannot be regarded as Wittgensteins view. He states that Wrights rejection of investigation-independence yields a picture of the relation between the communal language and the world in which norms are obliterated30. In light of this it is difficult to see how the susceptibility of the individual to be corrected by the community can be regarded as a form of normativity as there are no norms that may constrain the judgement of the community. McDowell states that this revelation turns Wrights argument on its question31as it is then becomes necessary to reject anti-realism in order to discern an applicable notion of meaning.According to McDowell, the crux of Wrights misunderstanding, shared with Kripke lies in their overlooking of Wittgensteins intention to refute the convergence of understanding with interpretation which reflects his appetency to preserve the sanctity of normativity and meaning. In fact, McDowell sees Wittgensteins goal as finding a middle path between two horns of a dilemma, one which he takes to be Kripkes view that understanding is necessarily interpretative leading to the sceptical paradox, and Wrights view in which expressions are behavioural reactions cultivated by the community making any notion of normativity an illusion. McDowell argues that the way in which we may follow a rule blindly avoiding the need for interpretation while retaining normativity is to situate the questions regarding rules, meaning and understanding within a framework of communal practices32and furthermore, to redefine what it means to be a member of a linguistic community. According to McDowell, a linguistic community is butt against together, not by a match o f mere externals (facts accessible to just anyone) but by a capacity for meeting of minds33. It is as a result of the capacity of members within a linguistic community to access aspects of other members understanding of expressions, that they are able to ascertain a shared meaning.McDowell concedes that Wright is correct to reject the idea that understanding an expression is to formulate a hypothesis concerning something concealed by the speakers linguistic behaviour. However, the anti-realist shutdown from this rejection is misguided in that it fails to also reject the idea that there is such a thing as surface linguistic behaviour. The linguistic behaviour of a speaker that is apparent to others must be characterised in terms of the contents of utterances34. A command of the language spoken by the speaker allows direct cognitive contact35with the meaning of this content and thus establishes true meeting of the minds. By this McDowell is suggesting that what we mean by our utteran ces is not hidden, it is in fact clearly discernible to those who speak the same language. By taking this view McDowell highlights Wittgensteins call for us to stop trying to look beneath the bedrock for reasons as to why we follow rules in a certain way. It is possible to ask further questions concerning the nature of rule-following and meaning but to do so blocks off the obvious and surely correct reading that hearing a word in one sense rather than another is hearing it in one position rather than another in the network of possible patterns of making sense that we learn to find ourselves in when we acquire mastery of a language36. When we learn a language we also learn the ways in which this language should be used there need not be a gap between the expression of a rule given in trainingand an action in conformity with it37. Therefore, when we understand an expression we use it in accordance with the communal use and our meaning is clear to those who share our language and custo ms. If we do not understand, our incomprehension is also clear and we may then be corrected. This appears to coincide with Wittgensteins belief that what is true or preposterous is what human beings say and it is in their language that human beings agree. This agreement not in opinion, but rather in form of life.38In this essay I have addressed the question of does Wittgenstein establish that language is rule-governed by discussing the issue of whether his account of rule-following can provide the justifications and normative standards that following a rule require. My exposition of the rule-following paradox and the deviant learner example revealed how Wittgenstein proved that we cannot provide a comprehensive account of rule-following by referring to the content of rules. However, even if this is the case, it does not necessarily mean that we must be sceptics regarding meaning as Kripke suggests. To believe that normativity and justification must be epistemic in nature is to misu nderstand what it is to follow a rule. Williams account of how training situated within a particular social structure leads individuals to follow rules blindly effectively encapsulates how the only justification we require for the way we follow rules is that we have been trained to do so. I do believe Wright raises a valid point in asking how we may recognise that our understanding of certain rules is shared by others. However, through my examination of McDowells view that by sharing a language we are able to gain significant insight