How Empirical Psychology Illuminates Issues in Moral Ontology Essay

How Empirical Psychology Illuminates Issues in Moral OntologyABSTRACT Although scientific naturalistic philosophers have been concerned with the role of scientific psychology in illuminating problems in moral psychology, they have paid less attention to the contributions that it might make to issues of moral ontology. In this paper, I enlarge how findings in moral developmental psychology square away and advance the discussion of a long-standing issue in moral ontology, that of moral realism. To do this, I break down Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeons discussion of that issue. I contend that their explorations leave the issue unresolved. To break the stalemate, I appeal to empirical psychological findings about moral internalization-the process by which children acquire the capacity to act in terms of moral norms. I contend that these findings illuminate the issue, suggest a way to advance it, and tend to stick out a moral realist position.Although scientifically and naturalis tically inclined philosophers are concerned with the role of empirical psychology in illuminating problems in moral psychology, such as the capacities for moral agency, they have paid less attention to its potential contributions to issues of moral epistemology and ontology. In this paper, I illustrate how findings in moral developmental psychology illuminate and advance the discussion of the long-standing issue in moral ontology of moral realism. Moral realism is the view that moral realities are objective, and thus in whatsoever consequential sense(s) independent of either the subjective states of moral agents or intersubjective factors. Naturalistic moral realism makes these objective moral realities part of the material world. I examine some recent disc... ...man on moral explanations of natural facts. In N. Gillespie. (Ed) Spindel Conference, 1986 Moral Realism., The Southern Journal of Philosophy , XXIV, Supplement, 69-78.Sturgeon, N. L. (1986b). What difference does it mak e if moral realism is true? In N. Gillespie (Ed) Spindel Conference, 1986 Moral Realism.. The Southern Journal of Philosophy , XXIV, Supplement,. 115-41.Zahn-Waxler, C., Radke-Yarrow, M. and King, R. A. (1979). Child-rearing and childrens prosocial initiations toward victims of distress. Child Development. 50, 319-330.Zahn-Waxler, C. and Radke-Yarrow, M. (1982). The development of altruism alternative research strategies, In N. Eisenberg (Ed) The Development of Prosocial Behavior (pp. 109-137). New York Academic Press.Zahn-Waxler, C. and Radke-Yarrow, M (1990). The origins of empathic concern. Motivation and Emotion, 14, 107-130.